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 
Abstract—This paper presents a requirement-based bidding 
language for agent-based scheduling. The language allows agents 
to attach their valuations directly to scheduling performance 
requirements. Compared with general bidding languages, the 
proposed one reduces agents’ valuation and system’s 
communication complexities. In addition, it results in efficient 
winner determination problem models. Experimental results 
show that the requirement-based language exhibits superior 
winner determination performance in terms of problem-solving 
speed and scalability.  
Note to Practitioners— e-Markets, such as auctions, are useful 
tools for scheduling resources among independent participants 
(agents). We propose a requirement-based bidding language 
which concisely and naturally expresses scheduling requirements. 
The key benefit of adopting this language in the design of agent-
based scheduling systems is reduced computational complexities, 
which makes the systems more responsive to large scale, dynamic 
and distributed scheduling problems.  
  Index Terms—Agent-based scheduling, economic based 
negotiation mechanisms, bidding language 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Combinatorial auctions have been used as a negotiation 
mechanism for designing agent-based scheduling systems 
where self-interested agents compete for the use of resource 
time [1-3]. Among others, a key component that impacts the 
systems’ computational complexities is the bidding language 
in which agents express their valuations over scheduling 
outcomes. Kalagnanam and Parkes reviewed four areas of 
computational constraints which restrict the space of feasible 
combinatorial auction mechanisms [4]. Among the four areas, 
three (i.e., communication complexity, valuation complexity 
and winner determination complexity) are affected by the 
design of the bidding language [5]. Based on the structures of 
their atomic propositions,  general bidding languages for 
combinatorial auctions can be classified into two types:     
and   [6].    languages use bundles of items with associated 
prices as atomic propositions and combine them using logical 
connectives.    languages allow bids that are logical formulae 
where items are taken as atomic propositions and combined 
using logical connectives. As an example, should a bidder 
desire (for price  ) any two adjacent hours in a four-hour 
window, she can express her preferences in either         . In 
   , she needs to formulate 3 atomic bids and connect them 
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using logical connective     to form a compound bid:   
〈{     }  〉    〈{     }  〉   〈{     }  〉. In   , such 
preferences are expressed in a logical bid of the form: 
〈(     )   (     )    (     )  〉. While    and 
   only allow agents to express their valuations on bundles or 
formulae of items, web-based bidding interfaces for 
procurement applications are much more expressive in terms 
of representing complex side constraints and discount 
schedules [7, 8]. However, those interfaces are intended to be 
used by human sourcing experts rather than software agents.  
Since     and    only allow distinct items, in order to apply 
them to scheduling auctions, the continuous scheduling time 
line must be discretized, such that the processing time of 
resources can be converted to a set of distinct time units [1, 2, 
9]. If agents need to reveal their full valuations, such as the 
case in Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanisms, general 
bidding languages require valuations on all      time unit 
bundles, where   is the number of time units available for 
bidding. In many realistic scheduling settings, to assure time 
precision,   cannot be too small. Given that the number of 
bundles to be evaluated grows exponentially in the number of 
time units, general languages can inflict heavy burdens on the 
auctions in terms of bids valuation, winner determination, and 
communication.  
This paper presents a requirement-based bidding language. 
Compared with general languages, the proposed language 
allows agents to attach their valuations directly to the 
performance requirement of a schedule. By avoiding 
expressing valuations on a large number of bundles, agents’ 
valuation and communication complexities are reduced 
accordingly. The proposed language also results in efficient 
winner determination models which improve problem-solving 
speed and scalability. In the next section, we present a 
scheduling auction model which extends the factory 
scheduling model described in [2]. The scheduling auction is a 
typical job shop scheduling setting. We use this model as the 
base environment for comparing bidding languages in terms of 
the complexities they impose on the auction.  
II. SCHEDULING AUCTION 
The scheduling auction consists of a set of agents. Each 
agent   has a set of jobs    to be processed. Each job      
requires the processing of a sequence of operations      
(      ). An operation      has a specified processing 
time     , and its execution requires the exclusive use of a 
designated resource for the duration of its processing. Each 
job      is constrained by a release time    by which the job 
is available for processing, and a deadline    by which the job 
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must be completed. For a feasible schedule with completion 
time   ,          , the agent obtains a value   (  )   . 
For any completion time outside (      ,   (  )   .   (  ) is 
determined by the agent’s internal mechanism which is 
language independent. We assume that, for an agent,   (  ) is 
given for any   . There are precedence constraints among 
operations of a job, but there are no precedence constraints 
among jobs. An allocation of processing time to jobs forms a 
schedule for agent  , denoted   . An agent’s valuation over 
jobs in    is additive, that is   (  )  ∑   (  )    . 
According to the additive valuation, as long as a schedule 
completes one job within (      , its value to the agent is 
positive. The objective of the auction is to maximize social 
welfare, the sum of   (  ) across all agents. 
Fig. 1 shows an example of the scheduling auction with 
three resources (        ) controlled by the auctioneer. 
Agent A has job1(              ) and job 2 (         ) to be 
processed. Agent B has job 3 (              ) and job 4 
(         ) to be processed. Arrows with solid lines represent 
the precedence constraints between operations; arrows with 
dotted line link operations to their designated processing 
resources. The scheduling auction can be an abstract model of 
various scheduling settings. In a manufacturing firm, for 
example, each sales agent may have a set of jobs to be 
processed. They may “compete” with each other for the 
limited processing resources to satisfy their customers’ 
requirements. The auction can also be seen as a general model 
of some agent-based scheduling environments described in the 
literature, in which an agent represents only one job[10].  
III. THE REQUIREMENT-BASED BIDDING LANGUAGE 
In the scheduling auction, an agent’s valuation on a 
schedule depends on the extent to which the schedule satisfies 
its performance requirement. Ideally, a bidding language 
should provide the expressiveness which allows agents to 
explicitly attach their valuations to performance requirements. 
However,     and     do not provide such expressiveness 
since they only allow an item or a bundle of items in their 
atomic propositions. We present a requirement-based bidding 
language, namely   , to address this limitation of general 
bidding languages in the domain of scheduling. 
As in     and    , the basic structure of    is an atomic 
proposition.     atomic proposition is more concise in terms 
of representing scheduling problems. It consists of a 
description of the job to be completed, a quality requirement 
and the price that the agent is willing to pay given the 
requirement is satisfied. The quality of a schedule can be 
evaluated by many types of scheduling criteria [11]. In our 
scheduling auction, we use the completion time of a job as the 
measure. Formally, an atomic proposition can be represented 
by a 3-tuple <Job, Completion-Time, Price>. 
Job specifies a sequence of operations and their required 
processing time on resources. The release time of the job and 
other processing constraints are also specified. Deadline of the 
job is not specified here. It will be expressed in the 
Completion-Time. For many scheduling models, existing 
general scheduling problem description languages, such as the 
one proposed in [12], can be used to describe the job 
specification. Since we focus on resource allocation in this 
paper, in our scheduling auction model a job is described as a 
set of resource and processing time pairs. For example, job 3 
in Fig.1 can be presented as ((     ) (     ) (     )  
    ), which means it needs to be processed by   ,    and 
   in sequence after the release time 5,  and the processing 
times are 23, 15 and 18.  
Completion-Time is the time range that constraints the 
completion of a schedule. For example, if the Completion-
Time is (      , its semantic interpretation is that the job is 
required to be completed after time 20 and before 40. 
Price is the amount of money that the agent is willing to pay 
given that the schedule of the jobs satisfies Completion-Time 
requirement. For example, the atomic proposition 
〈    (           〉 is interpreted as the agent is willing to 
pay $100 if the completion time of the job is within (      .   
Expressing a simple    atomic proposition using    or     
usually requires a compound XOR-bid with a possibly large 
size. For example, to represent 〈    (           〉 in   , we 
need to compute the set of all eligible schedules, denoted     , 
such that each        completes within (      . We then 
connect the set of schedules as an XOR-bid: 
         〈      〉, where each        is a bundle of time 
units. The sizes of   and      are usually not small in 
scheduling auctions with multiple resources and multiple 
operation jobs, such as the case in the example of Fig.1. If    
is used, in addition to the XOR-bid, the time units in each 
       need to be joined by | |-1 conjunction connectives.   
By connecting    atomic bids using XOR, we can express 
an agent’s values on different levels of Completion-Time. For 
example, we can use the following compound bid 
〈    (           〉   〈    (              〉  to express 
the valuation: If the job is completed between (       , the 
agent is willing to pay    ; if completed within (        , 
the price is reduced to      . It is worth to note that atomic 
bids in each of the three languages can be connected by XOR 
and/or OR to form compound bids. The key difference of the 
three bidding languages is the structure of their atomic bids. 
IV. VALUATION, COMMUNICATION AND WINNER 
DETERMINATION COMPLEXITIES 
In this section we compare valuation, communication and 
winner determination complexities of    and   . We use the 
benchmark VCG mechanism as our auction setting. VCG is a 
type of one-shot auction. It motivates agents to submit their 
complete valuations truthfully and computes optimal 
solutions. In addition to the comparison between    and   , 
Fig. 1 Example of the Scheduling Auction Model 
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we also analyze the suitability of    as a bidding language for 
the scheduling auction. 
A. Valuation Complexity 
In the case of   , agents have to implicitly express their 
valuation by attaching values to bundles of time units. In a 
standard combinatorial auction setting, an agent must evaluate 
     bundles, where   is the number of items sold in the 
auction. The valuation complexity in    is the computation 
needed to evaluate the bundles of time units. We first define 
the value of a bundle to an agent. For a bundle , if a 
schedule     , we say    is covered by . In many cases, a 
bundle can cover several schedules of an agent. We define the 
value of a bundle as the value of the best schedule which the 
bundle covers. 
Definition 1: Let   be the set of schedules of an agent 
covered by  . The valuation of the agent on bundle , denoted 
  ( ), is said to be the value of the best schedule   
   , 
such that for any     ,   (  
 )    (  ).  
In the scheduling auction, computing the valuation of a 
bundle to an agent is to solve the problem: Given a set of jobs 
to be allocated to a bundle of time units, what is the best value 
that a feasible schedule can possibly achieve? Answering this 
question is equivalent to solving a job shop scheduling 
problem with availability constraints (JSPAC), which is NP-
hard [13]. This proves:   
Proposition 1: In the scheduling auction with completion 
time as the performance measure, computing an agent’s 
valuation on a bundle is NP-hard. 
While    requires an agent to solve an NP-hard 
optimization problem to determine its value on a bundle,    
does not need to evaluate bundles. Since   (  ) is given, 
valuation complexity in    is trivial. It just involves the 
assignment of   (  ) to    for          . The maximum 
number of positive   (  ) is      . From agents’ perspective, 
   has the advantage of avoiding the hard job shop scheduling 
problem during the valuation phase. However, this does not 
mean the complexity of scheduling jobs to resources has been 
eliminated in a    model. In fact, this computation burden is 
shifted to the auctioneer’s winner determination problem 
(WDP). In    WDP, the auctioneer has to determine the 
winning bids and, at the same time, schedule jobs to resources. 
However, even with the extra task of job scheduling, as shown 
later in this section,   WDP is still more efficient than the 
standard   WDP in terms of solving speed and scalability. 
B. Communication Complexity 
Communication complexity is concerned with the size of 
the messages that must be sent by agents in order to compute 
the outcome of an auction. In combinatorial auctions, a full 
valuation requires agents to determine the value of      
bundles, which is exponential in the number of items. 
However, not all of them need to be sent to the auctioneer. 
Since we assume a VCG auction setting, an agent’s optimal 
strategy is to bid for the bundles for which it has a positive 
value. In the scheduling auction, if a bundle does not cover a 
feasible schedule for at least one job of an agent, it is called an 
infeasible bundle to the agent. Those infeasible bundles have 
zero value to the agent and need not be sent. A job   can have 
a set of many feasible schedules, denoted   ( ). For a 
      ( ), let   (  ) denote the set of bundles that cover 
  ,   (  )  { |    }, where the universe of discourse is 
the set of      bundles. Also, let   ( ) denote the union of 
  (  ), for all      ( ), which is ⋃   (  )     ( ) . Note 
that if an agent only has one job   to be processed, the set of 
feasible bundles it needs to send is   ( ).  
Let’s now consider the sizes of   (  ) and   ( ). By 
definition,   (  ) contains all super sets of   . Its size can be 
computed from the formula |  (  )|   
  |  |. Since |  | is 
the number of the processing time units required by job   and 
is a constant for a job, the size of   (  ) is  ( 
 ). Since 
  (  )    ( ), it follows that the size of   ( ) is at least 
 (  ), which proves the following proposition. 
Proposition 2: If an agent only has one job to be processed, 
the number of feasible bundles it needs to send to the 
auctioneer is at least  (  ). 
Given agents’ additive valuation over jobs, it is also true 
that if an agent has multiple jobs, its number of feasible 
bundles is still at least  (  ). We prove this statement by 
showing that adding more jobs will not decrease the feasible 
bundle set (or equivalently, increase the infeasible bundle set) 
of an agent. 
Proposition 3: Given a set of resource time units, adding a 
new job will not increase an agent’s infeasible bundle set. 
Proof. Let   (  ) contains feasible bundles of agent   
given the set of jobs   . Accordingly    (  )
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ contains 
infeasible bundles. Suppose that after adding a new job   , 
  (  ⋃   )
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ will increase. In this case, at least one bundle has 
to be moved from   (  ) to   (  ⋃  )
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅. However, according 
to the additive valuation of agents, each bundle in   (  ) 
covers a feasible schedule of at least one job in   . Therefore 
no bundle can be moved from   (  ) to   (  ⋃   )
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅. The 
proposition is proved by contradiction.  
In fact, adding a new job will likely decrease an agent’s 
infeasible bundle set (or increase its feasible bundle set) 
because a previously infeasible bundle may now be able to 
cover the newly added job. Compared with   , the 
communication complexity of    is much lower. In   , an 
agent only needs to send |  | XOR bids each for a job in   .  
Now we take a close look at the scenario where the agent has 
only one job to complete. To schedule the sequence of 
operations (           ) in  (       ), three 
constraints have to be satisfied:  
                                    (1) 
                                         (2) 
                            (3)  
where     is the starting time of     ;      is the processing 
time  of     . The starting time of an operation could vary in 
different feasible schedules. By counting the number of 
combinations of feasible starting time of all operations, we can 
calculate the number of feasible schedules using the following 
formula:  
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    (4) 
For the set of randomly generated jobs (used in the 
experiments which we will describe in the next subsection), 
the average number of feasible schedules for one job is around 
six hundred thousand and the number increases to a million if 
we extend the deadlines of jobs by five percent.  According to 
Proposition 3, adding more jobs will likely increase the 
agent’s communication complexity.  
C. Winner Determination Complexity 
Winner determination complexity refers to the amount of 
computation required to compute the global schedule. We 
compare the complexities of    WDP and    WDP through 
experiments.    WDP is a standard combinatorial auction 
problem (CAP) formulated in[14]. Here, we formulate    
WDP as a mixed integer program. 
1)     WDP Formulation 
Suppose that each agent submits a set of        bids for 
its jobs. Bids from all agents form a set  . The WDP involves 
the selection of a subset of   such that the sum of the values of 
the selected bids is maximized and that all scheduling 
constraints are satisfied. To model the competition of jobs for 
resources, we define           =1 if two operations      and 
       need to be processed on the same resource and 
             otherwise. Using the following variables: 
     the starting time of the operation   of the bid of job   
   {
                     
                          
 
           {
                                    
                                                   
 
The   WDP can be formulated as follows. 
   ∑     (         )
   
 
subject to 
                                 (5) 
                    (    )                                        (6) 
                             
                                                                         (7)   
          +                                  (8) 
          +                                  (9) 
           {   }    {   } and               (10) 
where       ,     ,           
     ;   is a large 
finite positive number. The set of constraints (5) ensures that 
the operations of a bid do not start before its release time. The 
set of constraints (6) ensures that an operation does not start 
before the previous operation of the same bid is completed. 
The set of constraints (7) is a set of logical constraints saying:  
If two bids  
 
and   
 
are selected in the schedule, and operations 
     and        are to be processed on the same resource 
(            ), and      precedes        (            ), then 
                . These constraints ensure that, at most, one 
operation can be processed by a particular resource at a time, 
where   is a large positive constant, which is used for the 
linearization of the logical constraint “if”. The minimum value 
of   depends on the problem instance. In general, a   
   (  )     (    ), where     and         , is large 
enough to enforce the logical “if” constraint. Constraints (8) 
and (9) ensure the values assigned to the two related 
variables            and            
 
are consistent, that is, if      
and        are to be processed on the same resource, 
then                         . Constraints (10) are non-
negative and integer constraints.  
To prove the NP-hardness of the model, construct a special 
case by randomly picking an atomic bid from each XOR bid 
and replacing the XOR bid with this atomic bid. Also assume 
that all jobs must be scheduled on one resource. In this case, 
the decision version of the special case is equivalent to the job 
Fig. 4 RL  WDP scalability over jobs and operations 
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shop interval selection problem, which is NP-complete [15]. 
2) A Computational Study 
We evaluate the complexities of winner determination 
problems formulated in    and    through experiments. 
CPLEX 10.1 was used to solve the winner determination 
models. We design our scheduling test problems based on a 
suite of job shop CSP benchmark problems developed in [16]. 
While the job shop CSP benchmark problems are constraint 
satisfaction problems, we add a price parameter   to construct 
the scheduling auction problem set. The price of job   is 
randomly drown from a uniform distribution on  (        
    ), where    is the average duration of all jobs, and     is 
the duration of job  . A problem set was randomly generated 
to include different sizes of problems (determined by the 
number of jobs in a problem and the number of operations in a 
job). In these problems the number of operations ranges from 
2 to 6; the number of jobs ranges from 2 to 7. In each problem 
instance, the number of resources is equal to the number of 
operations.  
The experiments were conducted on a 2.8 GHz Pentium PC. 
We first constructed   WDP and   WDP based on the 
description of a problem instance. Then we solved the two 
WDPs using CPLEX 10.1 respectively. In Fig. 2 to 4, each 
point in each plot is the average runtime for 10 problem 
instances with the same numbers of jobs and same numbers of 
operations in each instance.   
We present the experimental results from two perspectives: 
(1) given a fixed number of operations in the problems, how 
runtime changes when the number of jobs increases and (2) 
given a fixed number of jobs, how runtime change when the 
number of operations increases. As shown in Fig. 2, for the 
first two groups of problems (operation number=2 and 
operation number=3), the runtime of    WDP and   WDP are 
initially close. As the number of jobs increases, the difference 
increases quickly. For the rest two groups of problems 
(operation number=4 and operation number=5),    WDP is 
more than 10 times faster than    WDP even at the size of 2 
jobs.   WDP can be 100 to 1000 times slower when the 
number of jobs reaches 7. Fig. 3 presents the results from a 
different angle:    WDP does not scale well when the number 
of operations increases. On the contrary, the runtime of 
   WDP is virtually unaffected when the number of 
operations increases from 2 to 5 in all four groups of 
problems. The scalability characteristics of    WDP are 
further illustrated in Fig. 4. The scalability of    WDP 
remains good when the number of jobs is less than 5. As the 
number of jobs increases beyond 5, the scalability of    WDP 
decreases with a higher rate. Along the number of 
operations   WDP scales very well at all job number levels. 
D. Complexities of     
   and    take an item or a bundle of items as atomic 
proposition, which does not allow agents to explicitly express 
their valuation on scheduling performance requirements. 
Because an agent has to evaluate the      bundles in both 
cases,    and    are identical in terms of valuation 
complexity. Compared with   , representing a schedule in    
is rather unnatural. For example, to represent a feasible 
schedule    in   , all time units in    need to be joined 
together by |  |    conjunction connectives. If bundle-level 
languages such as    are used, then we can treat    as a 
bundle without placing any connectives between time units. It 
is reported in [6] that preferences involving disjunction and 
sharable resources can be expressed much more compactly in 
   than in   . However, this is not the case in the scheduling 
auction, where agents’ valuations exhibit strong 
complementarities. To represent complementary preferences 
using   , time units in a feasible bundle need to be connected 
by connective   (conjunction) and the feasible bundles are 
connected by XOR, which is essentially the same structure 
used by   . Since a large number of conjunction connectives 
have to be added to join time units in feasible schedules,    
incurs a higher level of communication complexity in the 
scheduling auction than    does. Based on the previous 
comparison between    and   , it can be concluded that    
has a lower level of communication complexity than    does. 
In terms of winner determination, a direct integer program 
formulation of the    WDP exhibits superior performance 
than that of    for several problem distributions[17]. 
However, the performance on XOR bids which are required in 
scheduling auction is not reported in [15]. The idea of the 
direct    formulation is to exploit the specific structure of 
logically specified bids represented in    to solve problems 
more effectively. However, the bids in scheduling auction are 
“flat” bundles. Representing them using    does not provide 
scheduling specific structural information that can be 
exploited by a winner determination algorithm. On the 
contrary, the requirement-based language preserves the 
scheduling specific structure, which opens the door to the 
design of specialized, high-performance scheduling winner 
determination algorithms. As we have shown in the 
experiments, even a general optimization package can benefit 
significantly from the preservation of scheduling specific 
problem structures.      
V. CONCLUSIONS 
When agent’s valuations on schedules are represented in 
general bidding languages, scheduling specific structural 
information is lost.  Agents have to attach their valuations to 
“flat” bundles, which leads to drastically increased valuation, 
communication, and winner determination complexities. We 
compared the general bidding languages and our requirement-
based bidding language in terms of their complexity 
implications to agent-based scheduling. We show that the 
requirement-based language provides concise, natural 
representations of agents’ valuations and reduces system’s 
communication complexity. An interesting finding is that 
although the auctioneer has to solve winner determination and 
scheduling problems concurrently when adopting   ,     
WDP formulated by incorporating scheduling specific 
modeling techniques can be more efficient than the standard 
   WDP in terms of solving speed and scalability.  
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